Wednesday, November 20, 2013

Pluralism: a Defense of Religious Exclusivism


Pluralism: a Defense
of Religious Exclusivism

Tuesday, November 19, 2013

The Source of the Question


Is exclusivism[1] acceptable in a rational world?  What follows is a highly simplified summary and analysis of the complex and rigorous philosophical paper, “Pluralism: a Defense of Religious Exclusivism.”  All analytical errors are my own.  Readers should verify this summary against the original paper.


Alvin Plantinga (1932—)



Summary


Dr. Plantinga opens with a riddle in his title, “Pluralism: A Defense Of Religious Exclusivism.”  One might expect, and for several paragraphs, observe, how religious exclusivism is superior to religious pluralism.  Instead, Plantinga shows that religious pluralism may serve to suppress or support religious exclusivism.  Pluralism, he maintains, is in and of itself a defense of religious exclusivism.

Plantinga begins his discussion with his pluralist beginnings at Yale, and asks if knowledge of truth is even possible.  Using two beginning postulates, he shows that these are not universally accepted for a variety of reasons: in fact there is a wide diversity of opposing ideas, so he asks what impact this has on his own religious beliefs.  He observes that knowledge of such pluralisms is as old as time.

Plantinga then leads us through a merry, albeit rigorous and tortured, philosophical chase examining a wide variety of pluralist objections to religious exclusivism: moral/ethical objections: “arbitrary, intellectually arrogant, imperialistic, or intellectually dishonest,” as well as intellectual/epistemic objections: “irrational, or unjustified.”  These objections are examined through a threefold lense: Fault is not inherent in the exclusion; Exclusivists must have a reasonable understanding of the pluralist problem and relative parity among its elements; Exclusivists realize that they have no proofs sufficiently powerful to convince all dissenters.  With this lense he proceeds to defeat each objection in turn.

Along this road, Plantinga shows that the pluralist is often defeated by his own argument.  No matter how the two postulates are opposed, or twisted. One still ends up being an exclusivist, and the objections fail.  He gives particular attention to abstention.  However, the abstainer is still, in reality, an exclusivist, because by his very abstention he believes that he has discovered a superior comprehension of truth.  He also examines the case of abstention without objection: if this is even possible, the abstainer has forfeited the discussion by refusing to raise any objection.  He also shows that these objections may attach to the way one acts out or acts up his belief system, but not to his belief system itself.

How about intellectual dishonesty?  This would require cover-up, denial, lying, or suppression of critical information.  However, there is no evidence that the exclusivist necessarily must engage in any of these to preserve his exclusivism: it happens, but it is not necessary.  Indeed, such tactics are self-defeating to the exclusivist’s internal logic.  Intellectual dishonesty involves the absence of alethic parity; but, by definition, the pluralist believes in the existence of alethic parity, so this objection becomes impossible.

Is the exclusivist arbitrary, irrational, or unjustified in holding his beliefs?  This appears to be Locke’s “palimpsest” in erasing and writing over all of philosophical history, which Plantinga defeats as well.  As long as the exclusivist has performed due diligence in studying the problem, and his brain is functioning in normal medical order, his belief system cannot be assailed for arbitrariness, irrationality, or unjustifiability, at least not without more detailed examination of the meanings of these terms.

How about being intellectually arbitrary?  Since alethic parity is necessary under the presuppositions of pluralism, the lack of parity must be epistemic in nature.  The exclusivist may have internal evidence, such as the “testimony of the Holy Spirit” or a compelling experience; which, although inexplicable and unobservable to the pluralist, are nevertheless compelling to the exclusivist.

Can absolute parity exist: not identically, but balanced?  Although there are no alethic equivalents on par with the existence of God, Plantinga continues for the sake of discussion.  In the case of serious moral crime, the jury must take one exclusive side or another; abstention is neither an option nor a positive moral value.  Since all decisions are based on the presented evidence, there can be no accusation of arbitrary behavior, no matter which way an individual votes in good conscience.  So, even if absolute parity were possible it would not establish arbitrary behavior on the part of any exclusivist.[2]

How about irrationality?  Plantinga examines five kinds of rationality: Aristotelian (ordinary human mentality), Deliverances of Reason, (advanced cognitive skills like deduction and induction), Deontological (conformity to duty or obligation), Zweckrationalität (the end justifies the means), Sanity or Proper Function (absence of mental illness).  None of these can be shown to militate against exclusivism; in fact they all drive toward some form of exclusive behavior as part of the normal rational decision process.  The business of making decisions is inherently rational and exclusive.  “You pay your money, and you make your choice,”

Are my beliefs justified or warranted?  Even if the extent of my knowledge is only 51% sure, I still have to make decisions in life.  Can I be wrong?  Sure, but that still does not make my decision unwarranted.  Abstention in the form of fence-riding or indecisiveness is no virtue and may well be unwarranted.  In any case the pluralist has no warrant for opposing my exclusivism.  After, I have reexamined all sides of the problem, I may still have reasons that are compelling for me, especially if I discover a reason for the disbelief of others, in which case my warrant is only strengthened and confirmed.

Are my beliefs influenced by reliabilism?  Of course, sociologically where I’m born and to whom makes a big difference in my belief system.  This does not make my belief system incorrect.  If reliabilism made any belief system incorrect then a pluralist would be unwarranted to believe in pluralism, because he had pluralist parents and grew up in an exclusively pluralist environment.  Plantinga deals with the complexities of reliabilism in some detail.  However, none of them show that the exclusivist cannot know that his belief system is true.

Are my beliefs consistent with proper function?  If my postulates are true, which is the starting hypothesis, then it is possible for me to discover that they are true, or at least find compelling reasons for believing them even if they are opposed.  This process is not irrational as long as there is a possibility that they are true.  The pluralist, as his own presupposition, has no claim that they are false, and consequently no claim that belief in them is irrational.  It is possible for me to know things that are exclusively true, which the pluralist cannot possibly know.

Pluralism, therefore has considerable value.  It challenges my exclusivity and forces me to reexamine it.  If I have believed in falsehood, I should be compelled to abandon it.  If my belief is weak or unfounded, it may be undermined.  However, even if my belief system is undermined, I may be driven to discover better evidence, so that in the long run, my exclusivism is finally strengthened.

My Conclusions


Everyone has a right to their own opinions without accusations or wrongdoing or claims of knowledge failure.  The Christian has as much warrant for these opinions as anyone else.  Granted, none of us should allow our own opinions to stand against overwhelming alethic evidence; but pluralism offers no such evidence.  Thus neither the opposer nor the pluralist has any warrant for objecting to my exclusive belief system.  Both opposers and pluralists in reality are exclusivists as well, and must be measured by the same objections.  So, either everybody is guilty, and all religious thinking is flawed, because there are no commonly agreed upon standards; or nobody is guilty.

Fence-riding, and indecisiveness cannot be considered virtues, even in such a complex and compound field as religious belief is.  Waffling in the face of moral evil is simply cowardice.  There are situations even in religious belief where people must man-up or woman-up and face the consequences.  Yes, even when they could be wrong.  All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.”[3]

Guilt with regard to the objections cited is not attached to the belief system itself, or to any belief system.  Guilt is attached exclusively to how individuals act out and act up in relationship to their belief system.

We did not discuss in sufficient length the agency of the Holy Ghost; or at any length, the fact that there is overwhelming evidence for the existence of God.

Also undiscussed is the fact that parties exist who remain in opposition in the face of commonly accepted overwhelming alethic evidence.  Such parties are guilty of extreme arrogance, irrationality, and prejudice; not because they hold to an exclusive belief system, but because they refuse to modify it, find an improved position, forgive their opponents, and be reconciled.  However, their fault rests with their alethic logic flaw, and how they have acted it out.

Nor did we explore the vast differences between propositional and relational logic.

Again, everyone has a right to their own opinions.  Consequently, a certain degree of gentleness and patience is required when we correspond with one another.



[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_exclusivism
[2] We remember that in logic, it is only necessary to show one exception to disprove a point.  Here the point is that exclusivism is necessarily arbitrary if absolute parity exists.  Because we have at least one exception the thesis is disproved.  Even absolute parity does not make decisions arbitrary.  Because of differences in experience and understanding the evidence is just as compelling for one juror as for another even when they disagree, even if they are swayed back and forth by discussion of the evidence.
[3] Disputed as properly attributable to Edmund Burke.  http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Edmund_Burke

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