Pluralism: a Defense
of Religious Exclusivism
of Religious Exclusivism
Tuesday, November 19, 2013
The Source of the Question
Is
exclusivism[1]
acceptable in a rational world? What
follows is a highly simplified summary and analysis of the complex and rigorous
philosophical paper, “Pluralism: a Defense of Religious Exclusivism.” All analytical errors are my own. Readers should verify this summary against
the original paper.
Alvin Plantinga (1932—)
Summary
Dr. Plantinga opens with a riddle in his title, “Pluralism:
A Defense Of Religious Exclusivism.” One
might expect, and for several paragraphs, observe, how religious exclusivism is
superior to religious pluralism.
Instead, Plantinga shows that religious pluralism may serve to suppress or
support religious exclusivism.
Pluralism, he maintains, is in and of itself a defense of religious
exclusivism.
Plantinga begins his discussion with his pluralist
beginnings at Yale, and asks if knowledge of truth is even possible. Using two beginning postulates, he shows that
these are not universally accepted for a variety of reasons: in fact there is a
wide diversity of opposing ideas, so he asks what impact this has on his own
religious beliefs. He observes that knowledge
of such pluralisms is as old as time.
Plantinga then leads us through a merry, albeit rigorous and
tortured, philosophical chase examining a wide variety of pluralist objections to
religious exclusivism: moral/ethical objections: “arbitrary, intellectually
arrogant, imperialistic, or intellectually dishonest,” as well as intellectual/epistemic
objections: “irrational, or unjustified.”
These objections are examined through a threefold lense: Fault is not
inherent in the exclusion; Exclusivists must have a reasonable understanding of
the pluralist problem and relative parity among its elements; Exclusivists
realize that they have no proofs sufficiently powerful to convince all
dissenters. With this lense he proceeds to
defeat each objection in turn.
Along this road, Plantinga shows that the pluralist is often
defeated by his own argument. No matter
how the two postulates are opposed, or twisted. One still ends up being an
exclusivist, and the objections fail. He
gives particular attention to abstention. However, the abstainer is still, in reality,
an exclusivist, because by his very abstention he believes that he has
discovered a superior comprehension of truth.
He also examines the case of abstention without objection: if this is
even possible, the abstainer has forfeited the discussion by refusing to raise
any objection. He also shows that these
objections may attach to the way one acts out or acts up his belief system, but
not to his belief system itself.
How about intellectual dishonesty? This would require cover-up, denial, lying,
or suppression of critical information.
However, there is no evidence that the exclusivist necessarily must
engage in any of these to preserve his exclusivism: it happens, but it is not
necessary. Indeed, such tactics are
self-defeating to the exclusivist’s internal logic. Intellectual dishonesty involves the absence
of alethic parity; but, by definition, the pluralist believes in the existence of
alethic parity, so this objection becomes impossible.
Is the exclusivist arbitrary, irrational, or unjustified in
holding his beliefs? This appears to be
Locke’s “palimpsest” in erasing and writing over all of philosophical history,
which Plantinga defeats as well. As long
as the exclusivist has performed due diligence in studying the problem, and his
brain is functioning in normal medical order, his belief system cannot be
assailed for arbitrariness, irrationality, or unjustifiability, at least not
without more detailed examination of the meanings of these terms.
How about being intellectually arbitrary? Since alethic parity is necessary under the
presuppositions of pluralism, the lack of parity must be epistemic in
nature. The exclusivist may have
internal evidence, such as the “testimony of the Holy Spirit” or a compelling
experience; which, although inexplicable and unobservable to the pluralist, are
nevertheless compelling to the exclusivist.
Can absolute parity exist: not identically, but balanced? Although there are no alethic equivalents on
par with the existence of God, Plantinga continues for the sake of
discussion. In the case of serious moral
crime, the jury must take one exclusive side or another; abstention is neither
an option nor a positive moral value. Since
all decisions are based on the presented evidence, there can be no accusation
of arbitrary behavior, no matter which way an individual votes in good
conscience. So, even if absolute parity
were possible it would not establish arbitrary behavior on the part of any
exclusivist.[2]
How about irrationality?
Plantinga examines five kinds of rationality: Aristotelian (ordinary
human mentality), Deliverances of Reason, (advanced cognitive skills like
deduction and induction), Deontological (conformity to duty or obligation), Zweckrationalität
(the end justifies the means), Sanity or Proper Function (absence of mental
illness). None of these can be shown to
militate against exclusivism; in fact they all drive toward some form of
exclusive behavior as part of the normal rational decision process. The business of making decisions is
inherently rational and exclusive. “You
pay your money, and you make your choice,”
Are my beliefs justified or warranted? Even if the extent of my knowledge is only
51% sure, I still have to make decisions in life. Can I be wrong? Sure, but that still does not make my
decision unwarranted. Abstention in the
form of fence-riding or indecisiveness is no virtue and may well be unwarranted. In any case the pluralist has no warrant for
opposing my exclusivism. After, I have
reexamined all sides of the problem, I may still have reasons that are
compelling for me, especially if I discover a reason for the disbelief of
others, in which case my warrant is only strengthened and confirmed.
Are my beliefs influenced by reliabilism? Of course, sociologically where I’m born and
to whom makes a big difference in my belief system. This does not make my belief system
incorrect. If reliabilism made any
belief system incorrect then a pluralist would be unwarranted to believe in
pluralism, because he had pluralist parents and grew up in an exclusively
pluralist environment. Plantinga deals
with the complexities of reliabilism in some detail. However, none of them show that the
exclusivist cannot know that his belief system is true.
Are my beliefs consistent with proper function? If my postulates are true, which is the
starting hypothesis, then it is possible for me to discover that they are true,
or at least find compelling reasons for believing them even if they are opposed. This process is not irrational as long as
there is a possibility that they are true.
The pluralist, as his own presupposition, has no claim that they are
false, and consequently no claim that belief in them is irrational. It is possible for me to know things that are
exclusively true, which the pluralist cannot possibly know.
Pluralism, therefore has considerable value. It challenges my exclusivity and forces me to
reexamine it. If I have believed in
falsehood, I should be compelled to abandon it.
If my belief is weak or unfounded, it may be undermined. However, even if my belief system is
undermined, I may be driven to discover better evidence, so that in the long
run, my exclusivism is finally strengthened.
My Conclusions
Everyone has a right to their own opinions without
accusations or wrongdoing or claims of knowledge failure. The Christian has as much warrant for these
opinions as anyone else. Granted, none
of us should allow our own opinions to stand against overwhelming alethic
evidence; but pluralism offers no such evidence. Thus neither the opposer nor the pluralist
has any warrant for objecting to my exclusive belief system. Both opposers and pluralists in reality are
exclusivists as well, and must be measured by the same objections. So, either everybody is guilty, and all religious
thinking is flawed, because there are no commonly agreed upon standards; or
nobody is guilty.
Fence-riding, and indecisiveness cannot be considered
virtues, even in such a complex and compound field as religious belief is. Waffling in the face of moral evil is simply
cowardice. There are situations even in religious
belief where people must man-up or woman-up and face the consequences. Yes, even when they could be wrong. “All
that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.”[3]
Guilt with regard to the objections cited is not attached to
the belief system itself, or to any belief system. Guilt is attached exclusively to how individuals
act out and act up in relationship to their belief system.
We did not discuss in sufficient length the agency of the
Holy Ghost; or at any length, the fact that there is overwhelming evidence for
the existence of God.
Also undiscussed is the fact that parties exist who remain
in opposition in the face of commonly accepted overwhelming alethic evidence. Such parties are guilty of extreme arrogance,
irrationality, and prejudice; not because they hold to an exclusive belief
system, but because they refuse to modify it, find an improved position,
forgive their opponents, and be reconciled.
However, their fault rests with their alethic logic flaw, and how they
have acted it out.
Nor did we explore the vast differences between propositional
and relational logic.
Again, everyone has a right to their own opinions. Consequently, a certain degree of gentleness
and patience is required when we correspond with one another.
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_exclusivism
[2] We
remember that in logic, it is only necessary to show one exception to disprove
a point. Here the point is that
exclusivism is necessarily arbitrary if absolute parity exists. Because we have at least one exception the
thesis is disproved. Even absolute
parity does not make decisions arbitrary.
Because of differences in experience and understanding the evidence is
just as compelling for one juror as for another even when they disagree, even if
they are swayed back and forth by discussion of the evidence.
[3] Disputed
as properly attributable to Edmund Burke.
http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Edmund_Burke
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